Shifting gears, shifting niches : organizational inertia and change in the evolution of the U.S. automobile industry, 1885-1981. by Dobrev,  S. D. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 September 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Dobrev, S. D. and Kim, T.-Y. and Carroll, G. R. (2003) 'Shifting gears, shifting niches : organizational inertia
and change in the evolution of the U.S. automobile industry, 1885-1981.', Organization science., 14 (3). pp.
264-282.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.3.264.15163
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2003 INFORMS
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Shifting Gears, Shifting Niches: Organizational
Inertia and Change in the Evolution of the
U.S. Automobile Industry, 1885–1981
Stanislav D. Dobrev • Tai-Young Kim • Glenn R. Carroll
University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 1101 E. 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Stanford University, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, California 94305
stanislav.dobrev@gsb.uchicago.edu • mnkim@ust.hk • carroll_glenn@gsb.stanford.edu
Abstract
We examine how experiential learning affects organizational
change and its consequences on ﬁrm mortality. We develop
hypotheses about the interactions of experiences with a spe-
ciﬁc type of organizational change on the one hand, and
environmental stability, organizational size, and organizational
niche width on the other hand. Our ﬁndings draw from anal-
ysis of the U.S. automobile industry between 1885 and 1981
and support the general prediction that “process” effects of
change in the organizational core elevate the hazard of fail-
ure. We also ﬁnd that a dynamic interpretation of organi-
zational environments as comprised of other organizations
helps to explicate the interplay between organization and envi-
ronmental forces that shape the occurrence and outcome of
transformation.
(Inertia; Organizational Change; Niche; Automobile Industry)
1. Introduction
Ecological theory posits that an organization’s ability
to change is limited by the structural conditions—both
internal and external—in which it is embedded (Hannan
and Freeman 1984). The argument runs counter to tra-
ditional perceptions about organizations as adaptive to
environmental shifts and able to implement change from
within (Pennings 1975).1
Despite the volubility of early debates, much con-
temporary research on organizational change aims to
reconcile the different perspectives about adaptation
(Levinthal 1991, Haveman 1992, Dobrev 1999, Gavetti
and Levinthal 2000). A popular approach that has
been offered within this vast literature might be called
“the content-process modeling framework” (Barnett and
Carroll 1995). This framework holds that to understand
the differences between adaptation and selection, the
(content) effects pertaining to the destination state in an
organizational transformation need to be separated from
the obstacles and impediments related to undertaking
the transformation (process effects). So, although inertial
pressures may be triggered during the process of change,
adaptation may be successful if they can be overcome
and if the destination state to which the organization
moves is indeed beneﬁcial.
Within this framework, a rapidly growing series of
empirical studies follow Amburgey et al. (1993) and
Haveman (1992) in analyzing the consequences of spe-
ciﬁc types of structural change in complete organi-
zational populations. In general, ﬁndings from these
studies link inertia to disruptive process effects. They
suggest that the detrimental effect of “core” structural
change occurs independently of the state (content) effect
and lasts for the duration of the transformation.2
While these and other studies generally agree with
the basic ecological prediction, there is a concern that
models of change effects typically underspecify content
effects, often relegating them to the level of control vari-
ables (Carroll and Hannan 2000). A common content
omission lies in the failure to tie in theoretical arguments
related to the initial triggers of organizational change
(Greve 1999, Barnett and Carroll 1995). This neglect
potentially undermines the reported ﬁndings regarding
process effects—A thorough understanding of process
effects can ﬂesh out only when the interplay between the
environmental and organizational forces that induce and
modify a transformation is consistently accounted for.
Unfortunately, organizational theory about the pro-
cesses of change is underdeveloped. Analysts typically
assume (often implicitly) that organizations are either
action oriented or inert, depending on which assump-
tion ﬁts the context and their arguments (Barnett and
Carroll 1995). In predicting action, theorists frequently
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envision organizations that are readily capable of mak-
ing correct assessments of their environments. However,
just because researchers can arguably identify attractive
market structures in retrospect by no means implies that
ﬁrms were able to do so contemporaneously (March
1978). Obviously, there is plenty of room here for theo-
retical development.
In our view, a potentially useful point of development
involves considering how environmental constraints and
opportunities interact with the internal perception and
interpretation of organizational experiences. It is clear
that the antecedents of organizational change hinge
at least partly on the internal processes by which
responses to environmental developments are assessed
(Greve 1998, O’Reilly et al. 1993). So, using theoretical
ideas about experiential learning to examine simultane-
ously both rates of organizational change and the conse-
quences of change might provide more insight.
Using the historical U.S. automobile industry as a
research setting, we attempt to illustrate the potential
value of this approach here. As our focal point, we
concentrate on organizational change emanating from
change in the niche, deﬁned as market position in tech-
nological space. The conceptual utility of the niche is
twofold here: First, it allows us to formulate concrete
theoretical arguments and use them to develop testable
empirical propositions, and second, it facilitates the inte-
gration of various theoretical frameworks and ideas from
an established and growing stream of research.3
In particular, we use a dynamic model of the evolution
of organizational niches (Dobrev et al. 2002) to deﬁne
state effects in the content-process analysis of trans-
formation. Tying “micro” processes within the niche
to long-term changes in the broader environment, this
model builds on evidence about the relationship between
an organization’s niche and evolution in the structure
of its organizational population over time. Focused on
the technological niche, this speciﬁcation attends to pro-
cesses of positioning and crowding among ﬁrms in the
niche space. In the environment, these processes are
related to the level of concentration among all ﬁrms in
the market. Substantively, the model posits that the pro-
pitious effects of both niche width and position in the
favorable market center depend on the overall consol-
idation of the industry, reversing themselves in cases
of high concentration. Informed by the theory of scale-
based selection (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000, Dobrev
and Carroll 2003), the model predicts intense scale com-
petition among most automobile producers and predicts
that the smallest producers beneﬁt from a highly con-
centrated market. It also posits that crowding within
a ﬁrm’s speciﬁc technological niche elevates mortality,
but that when concentration is high, crowding becomes
beneﬁcial.
Theoretically, we build on ecological insights about
structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and expe-
riential learning (Levitt and March 1988). We attempt
to explain, ﬁrst, auto ﬁrms’ propensity to shift niches
and, secondly, their likelihood of surviving such shifts.
For both dependent variables, we develop hypotheses
concerning how repeated niche changes of a ﬁrm inter-
act with three independent variables: market stability,
organizational size, and organizational niche width. We
test these hypotheses within the cumulative model spec-
iﬁcation mentioned above, which includes many previ-
ously established effects of organizational age, size, and
environmental characteristics (Dobrev et al. 2002).
2. Organizational Inertia and Rates
of Niche Shifting
Experiential Learning and Frequency Dependence
As noted above, we believe that understanding the out-
come of an organizational transformation should begin
with an investigation of the ways by which the change
came about in the ﬁrst place. It is widely believed that
experience impacts the propensity of an organization to
implement change. As it gains experience in undertak-
ing a particular type of change, an organization becomes
more likely to attempt a similar transformation in the
future (Amburgey et al. 1993). Experience with a certain
type of change also tends to constrain future transfor-
mations: The organization becomes less likely to experi-
ment with different types of transformation. The extreme
case of this constraint is what Levitt and March (1988)
call a “competency trap,” whereby organizations pro-
ceed down known courses of action even when inap-
propriate. Therefore, not only can change be derailed
by inertia, but inertia can emerge as an outcome of
change. In other words, learning and inertia both emerge
as a function of past experiences (Kim et al. 2003) and
experiential learning invariably entails both opportuni-
ties and constraints (Sørensen and Stuart 2000; Ingram
and Baum 1997a, b).
Of course, answers to questions of why organiza-
tions change also require consideration of both envi-
ronmental and organizational characteristics, as well as
the interplay between them and experience. The interac-
tion is particularly important because it reveals the inter-
nal mechanisms through which organizations interpret
and react to their external context. Following Levitt and
March (1988), we attend to three aspects of experiential
learning in organizations: (1) interpretation of experi-
ence, (2) complexity of experience, and (3) ambiguity
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of success. From this analysis, we develop hypotheses
predicting that organizational experiences interact with
environmental structure (shifts in the market center) and
structural properties of the organizational design (orga-
nizational size and niche width).
Environmental Stability and the Interpretation
of Experience
Because an organization’s environment consists mostly
of other organizations, its propensity to change is modi-
ﬁed by its relationship with other organizations. In sup-
port of this conjecture, Miner et al. (1990) reported
that Finnish newspapers afﬁliated with external politi-
cal parties have a higher propensity to change, while
Haveman (1993b) found that when large and proﬁtable
savings and loan associations decide to diversify, smaller
organizations are likely to follow suit. Similarly, Greve
(1995) discovered that the decision to abandon strategic
position is largely driven by social contagion. Because
ﬁrms constantly strive to outmaneuver or respond to the
actions of their competitors, we conceive of the organi-
zational environment in terms of the structure of the
market center, deﬁned by the technological niches of
the four largest ﬁrms in the industry. We do not engage
in speculation of whether shifts in the market center
reﬂect constraints or opportunities for most ﬁrms, but
contend that these shifts likely require all contemporane-
ous organizations to realign their positions with the new
conﬁguration. The empirical expectation is that shifts in
the market center will trigger change in market position
at the organization level and that market stability will
impede such change. More important, we are interested
in the combined effect of exogenous (market change)
and endogenous (experiential learning) characteristics on
the organizational propensity to implement change in
market position.
A major issue of organizational learning concerns how
to interpret experience (Levitt and March 1988). In a
market, the volatility of the setting likely matters, both
in understanding what happened and in applying this
knowledge to possible future action. We suspect that
organizational intuition to engage recurrently in a behav-
ior that has produced positive results in the past may
interfere with its capacity to interpret market signals
objectively. If this is correct, then the acquired propen-
sity to change because of prior success may override the
visibly better alternative to not change when the market
remains stable. When environments demand realignment
and repeating an experimented change is an adequate
strategy, experienced organizations are in a superior
position because they are more likely to initiate that
same or similar change. However, when environments
are stable, these organizations are at a disadvantage. This
is because relative to ﬁrms without prior change expe-
rience, they are more likely to follow the “wisdom”
of their experience, are more prone to misinterpret or
underestimate exogenous conditions, and are thus more
likely to change. If changes in niche position are path
dependent over time, then we expect to see experienced
organizations initiating change even when this leads to
a misalignment with stable environments. Our argument
posits that although market stability likely decreases the
likelihood of change for all organizations, experienced
ﬁrms will be more likely to make change under stable
conditions than will inexperienced ones.
Because our argument refers to the relative difference
in propensity to change between ﬁrms with and with-
out prior change experience, we use the term “relative
momentum of change” to describe this difference in
the likelihood of undergoing internal transformation
between the two sets of organizations. It should be dis-
tinguished from the familiar interpretation of “momen-
tum of change” which researchers have used to describe
the absolute effect of prior change on subsequent reor-
ganization (Amburgey et al. 1993, Amburgey and Miner
1992, Kelly and Amburgey 1991).
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The negative effect of market
stability on change will be weaker when relative momen-
tum is high.4
Organizational Size and the Complexity
of Experience
Features of an organization’s design also impact its rate
of change (Zajac and Shortell 1989). Research on rates
of change in organizational populations shows that the
propensity to initiate transformation generally declines
with size (Haveman 1993a). Substantively, the expla-
nation for the negative relationship between size and
transformation centers on arguments about the com-
plex and bureaucratic nature of large organizations. One
interpretation sees complex and bureaucratic organi-
zations as slow and clumsy, facing greater demands
for balancing incentives and coordination among a
growing number of internal constituents. Efforts to
meet such demands invariably reshufﬂe organizational
priorities and the ways in which resources are dis-
tributed. Another interpretation relates to the chang-
ing role of innovation and experimentation in complex
large companies. As the organization expands, these pro-
cesses become internalized and embedded in the devel-
oping organizational structures; innovation becomes
routinized.
Large organizations also likely face difﬁculty in inter-
preting their experiences. As the number of subunits
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and persons within an organization increases, the num-
ber of possible relations among them increases geomet-
rically. The sheer amount of information required to
store all behavior of a large organization strains cog-
nitive limits. Also, both bureaucracy and institutiona-
lization make it difﬁcult to understand what happened
and why because some (often not easily identiﬁable)
actions are routine responses and others are not. Such
complexity of experience likely makes it harder to act
in the future because it is unclear what outcome might
be expected and there are ample rationales available to
those who would resist the action. So, integrating ideas
about experiential learning (which empirically implies
relative momentum of change) and features of the design
related to the complexity of experience, we argue:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The relativemomentumof change
will decrease as the organizational size increases.
Organizational Niche Width and the
Ambiguity of Success
Organizational growth also often breeds expansion in
the organizational niche, thus constraining exploration
to occur mostly within the scope of the ﬁrm. When the
range of resources that constitute organizational inputs
is high, an organization is less pressed to explore beyond
its boundaries. The variation of outcomes needed to
support experimentation and learning can be produced
within its niche. Therefore, even though high variance
in resource utilization facilitates exploration, organiza-
tional learning is likely to occur locally (in terms of
market position), within the domain of the broad-niche
ﬁrm.
Organizations with broad niche width—generalists in
ecological theory—also face problems of interpreting
their experiences, which are likely to increase inertia.
Speciﬁcally, a generalist organization participating in a
broad array of market segments encounters a problem
of ambiguity regarding success and failure (Levitt and
March 1988). That is, the fate of the combined entity can
be plausibly attributed to a variety of activities or seg-
ments by internal actors, whether they are truly related
or not. As with complexity, the resulting plethora of
rationales likely inhibits future action:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The relativemomentumof change
will decrease as the organizational niche expands.
3. Structural Inertia and
Organizational Survival
In analyzing the relationship between organizational
change and survival chances, we build on arguments
about the core-periphery distinction to develop hypothe-
ses about how organizational size and organizational
niche width will interact with a change in niche width
in affecting mortality.
Core vs. Peripheral Organizational Change
Selection and adaptation models of organizational
change are often considered in terms of the differential
consequences brought about by changes in the organi-
zational core versus the periphery. Because reliability
and accountability emerge from the reproducibility of
core structures, inertial forces (along with the selec-
tion advantage derived from reliability and account-
ability) emanate from core features of organizations.
Many demographic studies of organizations ﬁnd that
core structural change is a precarious process; it leads
to an elevated probability of organizational failure, even
if the desired end state is on target. Changes affecting
the noncore or periphery structure do not produce the
same outcome; they might even lead to a lower risk of
mortality.
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) original deﬁnition of
the organizational core gives a hierarchical list of four
core features, including an organization’s mission, its
authority structure, its technology, and its marketing
strategy. Empirical applications of the inertia theory
using this deﬁnition of organizational core are not
unequivocal in their interpretations of core structures,
though most do ﬁnd support for the prediction that core
change elevates mortality (see Carroll and Hannan 2000
for review) and at least temporarily adversely affects per-
formance (Audia et al. 2000, Greve 1999, Miller and
Chen 1994).
Recent elaboration of the inertia story claims that the
deleterious process effects result from the length of time
necessary to replace structural and cultural codes gov-
erning blueprints for conducting transactions (Hannan
et al. 2001). The time to complete such replacements
depends on the centrality and connectedness of these
units in the overall organizational structure (Barnett and
Freeman 2001). By this imagery, the degree of inter-
nal and external misalignment that occurs during the
process of change depends on the location of change
within the organization—speciﬁcally, on the centrality
of units subjected to transformation attempts. Because
intended change in centrally located units triggers unin-
tended change in units to which they are connected,
the duration of transformation also increases. So, con-
sequently, do the expected negative effects of process
change.
Most studies of inertia resolve the location-of-
change issue by applying the core-periphery framework
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(Hannan and Freeman 1984) for analyzing structural
change in organizations. A typical research design of
this sort usually begins by deﬁning what organizational
features constitute the core, and then formulates pre-
dictions about transformations in those features. So the
“coreness” of any structural element is based on ana-
lysts’ assumptions about a speciﬁc class of organiza-
tions. For example, Singh et al. (1986) regard CEO
succession as a peripheral change, while editor-in-chief
replacement is deﬁned as an indicator of core change by
Dobrev (1999). The problem pertains partly to excess
generality in conceptualizing the core-periphery distinc-
tion: What constitutes a core organizational feature in
one organization can be a peripheral structure in another.
These discrepancies appear not only with comparisons
of organizations with different forms and identities, but
also to ﬁrms within the same population.
A more intuitive way of conceptualizing core features
and change in the organizational core stems from the
insight that the adverse impact of transformation arises
from its unintended effects. Because the unanticipated
consequences of organizational change are a direct func-
tion of the extensiveness of change, core transforma-
tion is deﬁned in terms of the additional subsequent
unplanned changes that need to be implemented as a
result of the initial change attempt. It is such cascades of
change throughout the organization that largely account
for the indirect and opportunity costs associated with the
transition between two states (Hannan et al. 2001).
Organizational Size and the Complexity of
Core Changes
We deﬁne change in market position as shifts in the
center of a technological niche (initiated by the orga-
nization) and propose that the extensiveness of change
will depend on the size of the organization. We construe
organizational size as an important source of structural
complexity and variability that reorders otherwise sim-
ilar organizations on the core-periphery dimension. We
trace this supposition to research that links the struc-
tural complexity of an organization with inertia (Hannan
and Freeman 1989, Barnett and Carroll 1995), sug-
gesting that complex organizations are inherently less
capable of initiating and surviving fundamental change.
Hannan and Freeman argue that, “the level of structural
inertia increases with size for each form of organiza-
tion” (1989, p. 82). A direct causal relationship between
scale, complexity, and inertia implies that large organi-
zations with dense and saturated structures will be hard,
and slow, to change. So, it follows that if “complexity
increases the risk of mortality due to reorganization”
(Hannan and Freeman 1989, p. 89), so too does scale
of operations. For these reasons, we surmise that large
size implies extensive changes in structures and routines
throughout the rest of the production process and the
organization. The empirical implication is an interaction
effect between niche center change and organizational
size:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). The deleterious effect of niche
center change on the mortality rate increases with the
size of organization.
The argument made above runs counter to predictions
that large organizations have a greater margin of error
that allows them to buffer the negative repercussions
of core transformation (Levinthal 1991). This advan-
tage attributable to large size emanates from the supe-
rior resources that large organizations command. Indeed,
researchers who criticize the theory of structural iner-
tia point out that powerful organizations in established,
economically central industries possess the capacity to
not only withstand internal change, but to impact the
course of industry development. In this way, exogenous
changes in the environment that often instigate attempts
at internal transformation for most organizations effec-
tively become endogenous to very large organizations.
We think that this argument is at least partly relevant
for the U.S. automobile industry, which for most of its
postwar history has been dominated by a few leading
producers. We also conjecture, however, that this logic
applies only to very large (as opposed to all large) ﬁrms,
while inertia considerations ought to prevail in predic-
tions of survival chances for the remaining subset of
scale competitors, subjected to core transformation. In
other words, across very high counts in the size distri-
bution, the effect of superior access to resources over-
rides the positive effect of process change in the core on
organizational failure (Carroll and Teo 1996).
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). The effect of size on the mor-
tality hazards of organizations experiencing a niche cen-
ter change is nonmonotonic, reversing from positive to
negative across very high levels of organizational size.
Organizational Niche Width and Core Change
Finally, we address the issue of variance in responses
to inertia. We ask the question whether all organi-
zations experiencing internal and external misalign-
ment are equally liable to inertial pressures, and to
answer this question, we investigate the organizational
properties that we suspect might—at least partially—
help offset the detrimental forces of environmental
selection.
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Are all inert ﬁrms equally likely to fail? This becomes
a salient question once we agree on the evidence show-
ing that inert ﬁrms are more likely to fail than noninert
ones as a result of undergoing internal restructuring. A
general answer is that some organizational characteris-
tics might serve as buffers against inertial forces. But
which characteristics? As organizations grow in age and
size, they become senile, rigidly bureaucratized, and bur-
dened by obsolete blueprints. Yet at the same time past
experiences and exposure to different contexts also pro-
vide learning opportunities for cumulating and interpret-
ing knowledge—the so-called tacit, organization-speciﬁc
capital, cognitively stored in the collective memory of
the organization. Organizations that actively promote
learning and exploration might also have a greater
chance of weathering selection pressures.
Theories of organizational learning posit that a princi-
pal mechanism by which ﬁrms learn from their experi-
ences involves continually investing resources to support
organizational search for new and better routines and
solutions (March 1991, Levitt and March 1988). The
success of this strategy depends on the extent to which
an organization can surmount pressures for efﬁciency
and slack-cutting and commit to building and sustain-
ing variation of outcomes to be considered as viable
alternatives to existing routines and practices. In sort-
ing out differences among ﬁrms in their ability to learn,
we think that organizational niches ought to matter
(Stuart and Podolny 1996). Speciﬁcally, the variation
necessary for learning will more likely be produced
and maintained by broad-niche organizations (general-
ists) that operate across multiple environmental states
and encompass large operational domains. Additionally,
broad-niche ﬁrms possess experience with transferring
resources between operational units, experience that may
be drawn upon in case the organization undergoes a mar-
ket repositioning and needs to move resources from the
origin to the destination state of the transition.
Indeed, the purported advantage of generalist ﬁrms
lies in their hedging strategy (Freeman and Hannan
1983)—They spread their bets across several alterna-
tives with uneven pay-off opportunities. Specialists, by
contrast, bet their success on exploiting a single nar-
row niche. This focused strategy inevitably results in a
trade-off between static efﬁciency and dynamic adapt-
ability because it deprives the organization of the oppor-
tunity to develop a broad set of competencies that
can be applied to multiple market domains, and to
gain experience in transferring capabilities and resources
across these domains. Broad-niche ﬁrms also beneﬁt
from internal variation—selection-based learning (Weick
1969). Therefore, the generalist advantage manifested in
a greater ﬂexibility and higher capacity for adaptation
serves as a buffer against the negative impact of process
change. It follows that the deleterious process effect of
change ought to vary by niche width.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The mortality hazard of an orga-
nization that changes its niche center is a decreasing
function of organizational niche width.
4. Data and Methods
We report here analyses of data on all American automo-
bile producers ever known to operate from 1885 to 1981.
These data derive from a larger collection effort that
coded histories of automobile manufacturers worldwide,
using reports of automobile historians and collectors
(Hannan et al. 1995). The most comprehensive infor-
mation comes from a multivolume encyclopedic source
book that provides thorough authoritative coverage: The
Standard Catalogue of American Cars (Flamang 1989,
Kimes and Clark 1989, Gunnell et al. 1987, Kowalke
et al. 1997). Supplementary information for recent peri-
ods can also be found in Kutner (1974) and Auto-
motive News (1993). The collection effort revealed an
abundance of ﬁrms. We found data on 2,197 American
automakers, many of whom were small, short-lived, and
obscure ﬁrms that introduced highly novel automobile
designs and production schemes.
Mortality Events: Outcome State Space
Organizational life histories end in a variety of ways. For
American automobile ﬁrms, the most important events
associated with the ending of an observed life history
involve one of the following: (1) disbanding of the ﬁrm,
(2) exit to another industry, or (3) merger or acquisi-
tion by another ﬁrm. The meaning of disbanding has
no ambiguity: The ﬁrm failed as a collective actor. In
automobile manufacturing, exit to another industry also
suggests a lack of success. The other ending events are
harder to interpret. Because of the ambiguous meaning
of mergers and acquisitions, we base our analysis on
disbanding and exit to another industry.
The sources do not tell exactly what happened to
most ﬁrms when they dropped from the set of pro-
ducers; this is invariably the case when spells of auto-
mobile production were short and when production
scale was tiny. Our reading of the historical materi-
als for the U.S. industry indicates clearly to us that
most exits of unknown type were either disbandings or
exits to other industries. So, we treated these two events
alike: the outcome event of interest in this analysis is
disbanding/exit to another industry, deﬁned to include
events of unknown type. Firms known to have ended
Organization Science/Vol. 14, No. 3, May–June 2003 269
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by other events (merger, acquisition, etc.) were treated
as (noninformatively) censored on the right at the times
of these events, per standard practice in event-history
analysis.
Variables
We follow convention in modeling a ﬁrm’s tenure (u)
in a particular organizational population rather than its
organizational age. Some ﬁrms’ records indicated that
they conducted other activities prior to entering the
automobile market. Because these de alio ﬁrms likely
entered with greater resource bases than de novo ﬁrms,
we included a dummy variable to indicate prior exis-
tence (prior existence). Carroll et al. (1996) showed that
this variable is associated initially with lower mortality
risks.
We specify the effects of organizational density (N )
in nonmonotonic fashion, consistent with established
theory and ﬁndings in organization ecology (Carroll and
Hannan 2000). This speciﬁcation includes a linear and
second-order term (N 2) of annual counts of the num-
ber of producer organizations. Following Hannan (1997),
we interact the effects of the contemporaneous density
variables with a set of variables measuring the age of
the population (ind. age). This speciﬁcation allows the
effects of density to vary as a function of population age.
We also include a ﬁxed covariate for each ﬁrm measur-
ing density at the time of its industry entry (density at
entry).
Organizational Size
We measured organizational size as scale of operations,
speciﬁcally the ﬁrm’s annual production of automobiles
(ln(size)). Previous analyses (Hannan et al. 1998a, b) of
automobile industries also measured relative size of a
ﬁrm as the ratio of each ﬁrm’s size to the size of the
largest ﬁrm in the national population at the time (rela-
tive size). For our measure of market concentration we
rely on the frequently used concentration ratio measure,
deﬁned as the ratio of the annual production of the four
largest ﬁrms to the total industry output for that year
(C4).
A promising way to model the competitive pressure in
scale-intensive industries comes through examining the
size structure of the competitive environment faced by
each scale competitor at any point in time (Carroll and
Swaminathan 2000). For this purpose, we use the exact
same scale competition measure developed by Dobrev
and Carroll (2003), and measure the aggregate distance
of all larger ﬁrms from the focal ﬁrm among competi-
tors whose size exceeds the annual scale production
threshold of 50, speciﬁed by Dobrev and Carroll (2003).
According to this measure, the greater the number of
larger competitors a ﬁrm faces, the greater the compet-
itive pressure it confronts, all other things equal. The
contribution of each larger ﬁrm to its competitive pres-
sure depends on the ﬁrms’ exact locations. When the
focal ﬁrm is small, then a unit size difference creates
more pressure than when it is large. Put another way,
the same difference in scale between two ﬁrms gen-
erates more competitive pressure for the smaller ﬁrm
when its absolute size is small than when its abso-
lute size is large. In the analysis below, we also use
a very small size dummy variable for size less than or
equal to an annual production of 50 cars (size ≤ 50) to
model the rate change and survival dynamic of nonscale
competitors.5
Technological niche width (NW) is deﬁned as the
range of engine capacity in horsepower across all models
produced by each ﬁrm in any given year. Niche overlap
density (NO) refers to the count of ﬁrms whose niches
overlap with the niche of the focal ﬁrm.6
The market center covers the range of the niches of
the four largest ﬁrms in the industry each year. Market-
center change can occur in one of two ways: First,
the niche of at least one of the four largest produc-
ers changes between two years in a way that shifts the
boundaries of the market center to reposition its mid-
point; note, however, that it is possible for as many
as all four leading ﬁrms to change their niche proﬁles
without impacting the existing boundaries of the mar-
ket center. This is important because it makes it hard
for other ﬁrms in the industry to distinguish the occur-
rence of change in the market position of an industry
leader from actual changes in the market structure. The
second way in which the market center can change is
if there is turnover in the top four industry leaders such
that a newcomer’s entry into the top four inﬂuences the
boundaries of the market center. Again, even a com-
plete turnover of the four largest ﬁrms can occur without
any shifts in the market center. Market-center stabil-
ity is a dummy variable that equals unity if the mid-
point of the technological niches of the four largest ﬁrms
in the market does not shift between two consecutive
years.
Distance away from the market center is measured as
the difference between the midpoint of the focal ﬁrm’s
niche7 and the midpoint of the market center. We esti-
mate the effects of the distances of ﬁrms both “above”
the market center (position: DAMC), meaning a niche
width that contains a larger engine capacity than the cen-
ter, and “below” the market center (position: DBMC).
We measure change in relative position as the differ-
ence in the distance from the market center at which
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the ﬁrm’s niche midpoint stands between two consec-
utive years, and absolute position change (niche-center
change) refers to the difference in each ﬁrm’s niche mid-
point between two consecutive years. We focus our anal-
yses on absolute position change because this type of
change, by deﬁnition, must be initiated by the focal ﬁrm.
By contrast, relative position change is used as a control
because this type of change can be registered even if
the ﬁrm’s niche remains static, but a shift in the market
center occurs between two consecutive years. Cumula-
tive niche-center change (CNCC) sums the number of
prior changes in a ﬁrm’s niche center and time since last
change is a clock variable that counts the years elapsed
since the last niche-center shift.
Although using a single dimension to deﬁne organiza-
tional niches has its limitations, a technology-based deﬁ-
nition allows us to draw meaningful comparisons among
ﬁrms that have existed in remote historical periods, and
thus makes it possible to analyze the industry in its
entirety. Moreover, the technology dimension is a good
indicator of the ﬁrm’s overall strategy and market posi-
tion (Stuart and Podolny 1996). Similarly, when used
to deﬁne internal transformation, technological change
reveals the correspondence between such change and
shifts in market position, as well as the ensuing orga-
nizational difﬁculties that they entail. Many historical
and anecdotal accounts of the industry accord with our
interpretation:
In 1938 the Ford Motor Car Co. tried to reach a new group
of customers by introducing a car that was smaller than their
V8 in size and power. After several years of development they
produced a car (dubbed 92A) that was narrower, shorter, and
600 pounds lighter than the regular Ford. However, the small
motor cost only $3 less to manufacture and the entire car could
be built for only $36 less than the big car    . [T]he project
was abandoned, signifying that the company would not expand
the range of its models downward. (Nevins and Hill 1963,
p. 118)
Analogous examples abound throughout the history of
the industry and reinforce the validity of our measures.
We also control for socioeconomic environmental con-
ditions. The estimates we report below are from spec-
iﬁcations that include effects of economic depression
(depression year dummies), the level of the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) adjusted for inﬂation (taken from
Maddison 1991), and dummy period effects represent-
ing industry regimes (mass production, product differen-
tiation, JIT/TQC) as deﬁned by Womack et al. (1990).
We excluded the years of the Second World War from
the analysis because the production of motor vehi-
cles for private use in the United States was mini-
mized for the duration of the war. This speciﬁcation of
socioeconomic environmental factors parallels those of
Hannan et al. (1998a, b) and allows for precise model
comparisons.
Model Speciﬁcation and Estimation
We represented variation in organizational tenure (u) as
a stochastic piecewise-exponential function where the
breakpoints for the pieces are denoted as 0≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤ · · ·
≤ P . Assuming that P+1=, there are P periods: Ip =
u  p ≤ u ≤ p+1	, p = 1
    
 P . After examining life
tables and exploring estimates of a variety of choices of
the breakpoints, we decided to break the duration scale
in the failure-rate analysis (in years) at: 05
10
30
70.
Distribution of events in the rate of change in the
niche analysis indicated that a more appropriate set
of breakpoints in the tenure would be at: 10
30

70
150.
We specify that both the disbanding/exit and the niche
change rates (ri are a function of tenure in the indus-
try (u); industry age (t); a vector of variables (s′iu) per-
taining to size (absolute and relative size, aggregate
distance from larger competitors, and dummy for very
small size); a vector of other measured covariates (x′it)
including GNP, depression year, and density at found-
ing; and a function of niche width, market position,
niche overlap density, and their interactions with con-
centration, denoted by ·. The functions for assess-
ing the arguments made in the hypotheses relate to
the effects of various measures of change in organiza-
tional position (POS) and in the market center (MC),
denoted by ·. The failure-rate models also include
a function for assessing the effects of contemporane-
ous density and density squared, as well as the interac-
tions of these density effects and industry age, denoted
by ·. The general class of models we estimate has
the form:
riu
 t = expmp exps′iup+x′itNt
 t
·gNWiu
NOiu
POSiu
C4t
·gPOS
MC
 u ∈ Ip
Here mp denotes a set of tenure-speciﬁc effects; the log-
linear link imposes the constraint that the baseline haz-
ards be nonnegative. The (tenure) period subscript on
the vector of size coefﬁcients indicates that we allow
these effects to vary by tenure in the failure-rate mod-
els. We estimated models using the method of maximum
likelihood, as implemented in TDA 5.7 (Rohwer 1994,
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995).
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Descriptive statistics for the variables in the event-
history ﬁle used in model estimation are presented in
Table 1a and their correlation matrix appears in Table 1b.
As per convention with time-varying covariates, this is
a “split-spell” ﬁle with spells artiﬁcially censored each
year and the values of the covariates updated.
Modeling Strategy: Cumulative Speciﬁcation
We build cumulatively on previous ﬁndings to estimate
a “larger” model of organizational evolution. These ﬁnd-
ings include speciﬁcations of tenure dependence, size
dependence, density dependence (Carroll et al. 1996;
Hannan et al. 1998a, b), scale competition (Dobrev and
Carroll 2003), and niche evolution (Dobrev et al. 2002).
Given the complexity of the ideas in the hypotheses and
the models, we do not dwell on estimates of each of
these effects, but simply report them. Note, however,
that their inclusion is central to our claims of building a
uniﬁed model.
To model effects of changes in niche width and
position, we experimented with both dichotomous and
continuous measures. In both rate of failure and rate of
change analyses the coefﬁcients estimated using the con-
Table 1a Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in Life-History Spell File
# Label Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
V1 Mass Production 000 100 090 030
V2 Production Differentiation 000 100 014 035
V3 JIT/TQC 000 100 008 027
V4 Depression Year 000 100 017 038
V5 Density 100 34500 20490 10955
V6 Density at Entry 100 34500 22487 10644
V7 Ln(Size+01) −230 1548 312 348
V8 Relative Size (×10−3) 000 528450 3555 28497
V9 Size≤ 50 (Dummy) 000 100 068 047
V10 Prior Existence (Dummy) 000 100 057 050
V11 GDP 4240 97710 20075 22107
V12 Niche Width (NW) 001 55201 1293 3209
V13 Niche Overlap (NO) 000 36200 8612 8275
V14 Position: Distance Above Market Center (DAMC) 000 20650 395 989
V15 Position: Distance Below Market Center (DBMC) 000 36425 1695 3302
V16 Change in Relative Position 000 27502 518 1179
V17 Niche-Center Change (Dummy) 000 100 052 050
V18 Cumulative Niche-Center Change (CNCC) 000 5300 383 657
V19 Time Since Last Change 000 900 017 066
V20 Market-Center Stability (Dummy) 000 100 045 050
V21 Industry Concentration (C4) 031 100 065 021
V22 Scale Competition×Size> 50 000 5992 106 343
tinuous and dummy measures are remarkably similar,
but the models with the dummy speciﬁcation provide a
signiﬁcantly better ﬁt for the data. For this reason, we
report the results from these speciﬁcations.
5. Findings
We ﬁrst report analysis of niche shifts, designed to test
Hypotheses 1–3. We then turn to the models of the
effects of niche change on organizational mortality.
Rate of Position Change
The results of the rate of change analysis are presented
in Table 2. The baseline Model 2a includes the posi-
tive and signiﬁcant effect of cumulative change, which
agrees with the frequency dependence argument. While
experiential learning promotes the occurrence of change,
market stability deters it: The main effect of the envi-
ronmental variable for market-center stability is negative
and signiﬁcant, as expected.
In the next model (Model 2b in Table 2), we add the
interaction effects that test Hypotheses 1–3. In accord
with H1, the negative effect of market-center stability
is weaker for ﬁrms with increasing cumulative change
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Table 2 Estimated Effects of Prior Position Change on the Rate of Position Change of U.S. Automo-
bile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
2a 2b Hypothesis Tested
Technological Niche Width and Position
Niche Width (NW) −001 −107 −001 −128
Position:
Distance Above Market Center (DAMC) 0004 047 0004 047
Distance Below Market Center (DBMC) −006 −712 −006 −654
Change in Relative Position 001 492 001 518
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NW 001 103 001 153
C4×Position: DAMC −002 −196 −002 −186
C4×Position: DBMC 006 692 005 634
C4×NW×Size≤ 50 −0002 −159 −001 −279
Overlap Density
Niche Overlap (NO) 001 528 001 534
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NO −001 −433 −001 −443
C4×NO×Size≤ 50 0004 441 0004 459
Cumulative Absolute Position Change
Cumulative Niche-Center Change (CNCC) 002 572 004 532
Market-Center Stability −072 −182 −088 −205
Evolutionary Processes:
CNCC×Market-Center Stability 0046 1065 H1
CNCC×Ln(Size) −0002 −265 H2
CNCC×NW −00001 −208 H3
Number of Spells/Events 8,892/4,653 8,892/4,653
Number of Parameters 30 33
LR Test 108.6 (vs. b)
Log-Likelihood −58172 −57629
Note. T -statistics are in parentheses. u denotes tenure in the industry. The model also includes the following
covariates: Tenure in industry, prior existence, period effects, depression years, GDP, Ln(Size), size ≤ 50,
relative size, industry concentration, scale competition measure, and an interaction of industry concentration
and size≤ 50. See Appendix A for the estimated coefﬁcients associated with these variables.
experience. The result suggests an interesting dynamic
that we plot in Figure 1: The organizational propensity
to change increases with number of prior changes.
According to the estimate, a ﬁrm with 17 prior change
experiences becomes about twice as likely as a ﬁrm
that had not changed before to undergo niche-center
change again (exp004 ·17= 197. Interestingly, this
difference becomes ampliﬁed during periods when the
market center is stable. According to our estimates, the
ﬁrm with 17 change experiences becomes 4.31 times
more likely to change by misinterpreting environmen-
tal signals than a ﬁrm without any change experience
(exp004 · 17+ 0046 · 17 = 431). Therefore, even
though during market stability all ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
less likely to initiate change, the disparity in the propen-
sity to initiate change between ﬁrms with and without
prior change experience widens substantially (about 2.2
times in the above example).8
Finally, internal growth and expansion appear to
slow organizations down. The results lend support to
Hypotheses 2 and 3: We estimate signiﬁcant negative
effects on the rate of change for the interaction terms of
cumulative change with size and with niche width. Inter-
preting the coefﬁcients, they reveal that the twice-as-
likely-to-change ﬁrm with 17 prior change experiences
becomes only one and a half times more likely to change
if its scale of operation is as high as 2,600. The same
decrease in that ﬁrm’s propensity to change also results
from a niche width of 159.
Rate of Disbanding/Exit
Results from the failure-rate analysis are presented
in Table 3.9 The baseline Model 3a contains main
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Figure 1 Cumulative Prior Change Effects on the Rate of Change of U.S. Automobile Producers, 1885–1981
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effects for market-center stability, niche-center change,
and cumulative prior niche-center changes; of these
only the latter is signiﬁcant, suggesting that experience
with change increases survival chances upon subsequent
change. In the next model (Model 3b) we add the inter-
action effects implied by Hypotheses H4a, H4b, and H5.
To test Hypotheses H4a andH4b, we interacted niche-
center change with the log of size and its square, expect-
ing the effect of the former to be positive, and that of
the latter to be negative. The estimates agree with our
predictions. To help interpret these effects across the
observed size range in the population, they are plotted in
Figure 2. As the curves indicate, the multiplier of posi-
tion change on the hazard of failure across the size distri-
bution is nonmonotonic and has an inverted U -shape. It
is positive for all ﬁrms with the exception of the outliers
sitting at both ends of the size distribution: Niche-center
change increases mortality for all ﬁrms who produce at
least six and up to (roughly) one million cars per year.
The positive change effect is the strongest for a ﬁrm
with size 2,600, at which point the hazard is slightly
more than 1.7 times as high as that of a ﬁrm whose size
equals 1.
The estimates also suggest that the positive change
effect on the hazard declines with niche width, as
predicted by Hypothesis 5. The interaction effect of
position change with niche width is negative and signiﬁ-
cant. The effect implies that learning by exploration can
indeed contain the inauspicious process effect of change
that impinges on the organizational core. For example, a
ﬁrm with a size of 2,600 that had implemented position
change (and thus increased its hazard by 1.71) must have
a niche width of at least 67 in order to counter inertial
forces exp−0008 · 67= 059.
Effects of Other Covariates
As we discussed above, our model for the exit/dis-
banding-rate analysis builds on the exact speciﬁcation
estimated by Dobrev et al. (2002). Though we ﬁnd it
unnecessary to review in detail these estimates again
here (found in Appendix B), we note the value of
empirical cumulativity in building a general evolutionary
model of the U.S. auto industry.
We also think that our baseline model in the rate
of change analysis, reported in Appendix A, possibly
deserves attention, as it contributes to Dobrev et al.’s
(2002) model of the evolution of organizational niches.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that as the industry consolidates, the
effects of scale, scope, position, and crowding change,
not only in the way that they affect survival, but also
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Table 3 Estimated Effects of Position Change Variables on the Disbanding/Exit Hazard of U.S.
Automobile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
3a 3b Hypothesis Tested
Technological Niche Width and Position
Niche Width (NW) −004 −407 −005 −435
Position:
Distance Above Market Center (DAMC) 001 089 001 114
Distance Below Market Center (DBMC) 004 394 004 429
Change in Relative Position 00002 005 0001 031
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NW 006 443 006 497
C4×Position: DAMC −001 −069 −001 −091
C4×Position: DBMC −004 −356 −004 −394
C4×NW×Size≤ 50 −001 −131 −001 −142
Overlap Density
Niche Overlap (NO) 0003 210 0004 255
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NO −0005 −140 −001 −198
C4×NO×Size≤ 50 0005 191 001 248
Absolute Position Change
Niche-Center Change (NCC) −013 −171 −033 −356
Cumulative Niche-Center Change (CNCC) −004 −291 −003 −244
Time Since Last Change −002 −043 003 059
Market-Center Stability −003 −047 −005 −075
Evolutionary Processes:
NCC×Ln(Size) 022 398 H4a
NCC×Ln(Size)2 (×10−1) −014 −199 H4b
NCC×NW −001 −282 H5
Number of Spells/Events 8,892/2,051 8,892/2,051
Number of Parameters 41 44
LR Test 33.4 (vs. 3a)
Log-Likelihood −36355 −36188
Note. T -statistics are in parentheses. u denotes tenure in the industry. The model also includes
the following covariates: Tenure in industry, prior existence, period effects, depression years, GDP,
Ln(Size), size≤ 50, relative size, industry concentration, scale competition measure, and an interac-
tion of industry concentration and size≤ 50. See Appendix B for the estimated coefﬁcients associated
with these variables.
in the way that they modify ﬁrms’ propensity to shift
positions. For example, the results indicate that nonscale
competitors (i.e., ﬁrms with annual production of 50 or
fewer automobiles) are less likely to change initially, but
as the industry concentrates become even more likely
than larger ﬁrms to explore new market territories. Sim-
ilarly, ﬁrms located in the “low end” of the market turn
from less to more likely to change as the combined share
of the top four producers increases. Finally, the anal-
ysis reveals that the initially positive effect of crowd-
ing (the number of ﬁrms whose niches overlap with the
focal ﬁrm) on change in market position reverses direc-
tion along with industry consolidation, while at the same
time concentration ampliﬁes the positive effect of crowd-
ing for nonscale competitors. These effects proved pow-
erful and robust in our analysis.10
6. Discussion
Our basic ﬁnding is not new—We presented evidence
showing that inert organizations are both less likely to
change and more likely to fail as a result of transfor-
mation. What makes our efforts distinctive here is that
we treated inertia as an organizational property that can
be triggered, or (partly) contained by the complex inter-
actions between characteristics of the internal context
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Figure 2 Change Effects (by Size) on the Failure Hazard of U.S. Automobile Producers, 1885–1981
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and the external landscape. In doing so, we beneﬁted
from focusing on an organization-based dimension of the
environment that revealed shifts in the market structure
in terms of the changing conﬁguration of competitors
continuously striving to respond to, anticipate, and out-
pace each other. We also relied on the core-periphery
distinction to conceptualize and measure the extensive-
ness of organizational change in a way that establishes
direct links between core structures and process effects
of transformation. By taking this approach we were able
to investigate processes that unfold at the intersection of
organization and environment and shape the occurrence
and outcome of organizational change.
One of these processes points to the important inter-
action between organizational learning and change. We
ﬁnd that experiential learning translates to a survival
advantage when implementing a change consistent with
past experience is warranted, but makes the organization
liable to selection when environmental shifts demand a
new repertoire of actions. In our empirical application,
the results suggest that in periods when the environment
is at rest, ﬁrms with prior change experience are more
likely (than their counterparts) to remain locked in past
behavioral patterns and misinterpret the extent and con-
tent of exogenous change. However, whereas position
moves synchronized with external shifts increase sur-
vival chances, competency traps (i.e., repetitively engag-
ing in outdated actions) elevate failure rates. In sum,
whether prior experience is beneﬁcial or not depends on
the mechanisms by which ﬁrms interpret and respond to
their environments.
Organizational inertia develops as a by-product of
structural reproducibility, which emerges in response
to demands for the reliability and accountability with
which an organization can perform certain actions. Reli-
ability and accountability, in turn, are engendered as
the organization gains experience and becomes better at
the tasks it performs. According to our ﬁndings, path-
dependent learning induces reproducibility of structure,
which then makes the set of organizational actions more
reliable, but also more narrow and exclusive. In other
words, past experiences simultaneously engender sur-
vival advantage in selection processes and liability to
inertia that jeopardizes survival. Which of the two prop-
erties ultimately decides the outcome of change depends
on how the organization-environment dynamic unfolds.
The effects of other important organizational char-
acteristics on change and survival that we considered
in this research did not appear to be unidirectional
either. Properties of the organizational design inﬂuence
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the likelihood of initiating and surviving transforma-
tion by mechanisms that also reﬂect interaction effects
with the environment. Generalism, or broad technologi-
cal niche, for example, is by and large associated with
exploratory learning. Organizations that operate across
multiple domains (i.e., support multiple products) by
deﬁnition must be able to tolerate variation of out-
comes and to devote slack resources to support it. When
shifts in the external context reshufﬂe the distribution
of resources, generalists are more likely than special-
ists to already possess experience and competencies in
the market areas in which resource availability expands.
Additionally, operation across multiple market domains
fosters the development of routines and practices that
facilitate the transferring of internal resources between
different domains, and such routines and practices may
be drawn upon when an organization embarks on a tran-
sition between different states.
So, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with broad technological niches
are better able to weather the negative process effects
of transformation, independent of the state effects asso-
ciated with being a generalist posited by the theory of
evolution of organizational niches. This ﬁnding is impor-
tant because it underlines the value of using an estab-
lished theory of the organization-environment relation
in conjunction with the study of organizational change.
Combining the two, we show that the niche width effect
reverses from beneﬁcial to detrimental along with rising
market concentration. When organizations adjust their
operational domains to reﬂect these changes in the char-
acteristics of environmental states, generalists have a
higher probability of doing so successfully.
However, while generalist organizations are more
likely to survive position change, they are also less likely
to initiate it, according to our ﬁndings. This supports our
conjecture that as organizational niches expand, innova-
tion likely becomes routinized within the context of the
evolving organizational structure (Dobrev and Barnett
2002). Overall, we think our ﬁndings and theorizing
point to a useful symbiosis between ecological and
learning theory which future research can elaborate in
analyses of organizational change.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the FMC Faculty Research Fund at the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge research assistance from John Burrows, Rebecca Butz,
Brian O’Leary, and Carmen Turillo. For helpful comments, they thank
Matt Bothner, Ron Burt, Jerker Denrell, Mike Hannan, Damon Phillips,
Toby Stuart, and Valery Yakubovich, as well as the Organization Science
Senior Editor Huggy Rao and three anonymous reviewers.
Appendix A Estimated Effects of Other Covariates in Models
in Table 2
Model Number 2a 2b
Industry Tenure and
Prior Experience
Tenure in the Industry
u < 1 −066 −285 −065 −276
1≤ u < 3 −056 −241 −059 −250
3≤ u < 7 −080 −341 −090 −372
7≤ u < 15 −091 −381 −105 −421
u≥ 15 −114 −441 −135 −504
Prior Existence −002 −075 −003 −093
Socio-Econ-Industrial
Environment
Mass Production −005 −078 −005 −073
Production Differentiation −028 −196 −012 −079
JIT/TQC −053 −330 −034 −207
Depression Year 006 136 008 179
GDP 0001 266 0001 130
Organizational Size-Based
Measures
Ln(Size) −001 −098 001 057
Size≤ 50 −070 −378 −062 −322
Relative Size (×10−3) −001 −221 −001 −006
Industry Concentration (C4) 074 271 074 264
Evolutionary Processes:
Scale Competition×Size> 50 −0001 −015 0001 022
C4×Size≤ 50 071 346 072 333
Note. Other estimated effects in models appear in Table 2.
Appendix B Estimated Effects of Other Covariates in Models
in Table 3
Model Number 3a 3b
Industry Tenure and
Prior Experience
Tenure in the Industry
u < 05 −172 −276 −162 −260
05≤ u < 1 −175 −281 −160 −258
1≤ u < 3 −218 −348 −203 −325
3≤ u < 7 −229 −366 −217 −374
u≥ 7 −178 −244 −161 −221
Prior Existence −011 −231 −010 −222
Socio-Econ-Industrial
Environment
Mass Production 079 448 076 430
Production Differentiation 045 174 054 213
JIT/TQC 049 132 043 116
Depression Year −022 −317 −022 −312
GDP −0003 −281 −0003 −271
N −001 −263 −002 −282
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Appendix B (cont’d.)
Model Number 3a 3b
N2 (×10−4) 055 227 059 245
N× Ind. Age (×10−3) 056 188 065 219
N2× Ind. Age (×10−5) −039 −241 −043 −261
N× Ind. Age2 (×10−4) −010 −213 −011 −241
N2× Ind. Age2 (×10−6) 008 258 009 274
Density at Entry 0001 261 0001 202
Organizational Size-Based
Measures
Ln(Size)
u < 7 −012 −422 −019 −595
u≥ 7 −014 −241 −023 −377
Size ≤ 50
u < 7 151 305 142 287
u≥ 7 093 157 082 139
Relative Size (×10−3) −002 −226 −002 −157
Industry Concentration (C4) 133 180 135 186
Evolutionary Processes:
Scale Competition×Size> 50 003 333 003 277
C4×Size≤ 50 −108 −177 −107 −177
Note. Other estimated effects in models appear in Table 3.
Appendix C GEE Estimates of a Two-Stage Pooled Logit
Regression Model of the Disbanding/ Exit of U.S.
Automobile Manufacturers, 1885–1981
Industry Tenure and Prior Experience
Tenure in the Industry 001 044
Prior Existence −017 −294
Socio-Econ-Industrial Environment
Mass Production 107 478
Production Differentiation 076 214
JIT/TQC 063 131
Depression Year −031 −369)
GDP −001 −280)
N −002 −249)
N2 ×10−4 064 212
N× Ind. Age (×10−3) 065 181
N2× Ind. Age (×10−5 −048 −234)
N× Ind. Age2 (×10−4 −012 −205)
N2× Ind. Age2 (×10−6) 010 253
Density at Entry 0001 211)
Organizational Size-Based Measures
Ln(Size) −025 −738
Size≤ 50 120 249
Relative Size (×10−3) −002 −130
Industry Concentration (C4) 145 187
Evolutionary Processes:
Scale Competition×Size> 50 003 270
C4×Size≤ 50 −097 −163
Appendix C (cont’d.)
Technological Niche Width and Position
Niche Width (NW) −006 −513
Position:
Distance Above Market Center (DAMC) 002 163
Distance Below Market Center (DBMC) 006 448
Change in Relative Position 0002 055
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NW 008 541
C4×Position: DAMC −002 −129
C4×Position: DBMC −006 −418
C4×NW×Size≤ 50 −001 −143
Overlap Density
Niche Overlap (NO) 001 286
Evolutionary Processes:
C4×NO −001 −227
C4×NO×Size≤ 50 001 287
Absolute Position Change
Niche-Center Change (NCC) −032 −299
Cumulative Niche-Center Change (CNCC) −004 −125
Time Since Last Change 007 131
Market-Center Stability −010 −078
Evolutionary Processes:
NCC×Ln(Size) 026 369
NCC×Ln(Size)2 ×10−1) −016 −182
NCC×NW −001 −314
Selectivity −025 −078
Constant −165 −249
Number of Observations 8892
Number of Firms 2051
Wald X2 83092
Note. T -statistics are in parentheses. Scale parameter= 1; Selectiv-
ity term includes second-order effects of covariates from Model 2b.
Endnotes
1Theories whose arguments typically rest on assumptions about orga-
nizational adaptation include resource dependence (Zald 1970, Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978), contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967;
Galbraith 1973, 1977), transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975,
1981), and institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Meyer
and Scott 1983), among others. At least implicitly, these theories
treat organizations as capable of profound transformation—be it in
response to the reshufﬂing of resources in the environment to safe-
guard transactions, or in response to the normative diffusion of struc-
tural models. By contrast, the theory of structural inertia (Hannan
and Freeman 1984, Barnett and Carroll 1995) posits that fundamen-
tal change degrades structural reproducibility, and thus diminishes the
organization’s capacity to act as a reliable and accountable corporate
actor.
2However, several studies report no evidence that the hazard of fail-
ure subsides as a function of time elapsed after the change. Thus,
change-induced failure may be a function of both inertia (process) and
maladaptive transformation to the wrong state (Minkoff 1999, Dobrev
et al. 2001).
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3The niche concept has proved central in understanding the
organization-environment relation, a dynamic that we seek to integrate
more closely here to the analysis of organizational change. Relying
on the deﬁnition of niche as a multidimensional constrained resource
space including social, economic, and political dimensions (Freeman
and Hannan 1983), subsequent analyses have shown how organiza-
tional environments affect the viability of particular types of organi-
zations (Carroll 1988, Singh 1990, Baum and Singh 1994b) and how
the locations of organizations relative to each other along one (or a
few) dimension(s) of resource space affect the dynamic of compe-
tition (Baum and Mezias 1992, Baum and Haveman 1997). In all,
while the primary advantage of conceptualizing the content-process
model of change in terms of technological niches is the explanatory
power of the niche concept, a secondary but equally important beneﬁt
is that doing so allows us to seed our theory with broader ideas from
organizational sociology and integrate them within the framework of
our model.
4Another way to state this hypothesis might be “The relative momen-
tum of change will increase with market stability.” However, this
wording gives some a mistaken impression about the expected effect
of market stability. We thank a reviewer for suggesting the alternative
wording.
5In Dobrev and Carroll’s (2003) assessment, automobile manufac-
turing ﬁrms had to reach certain minimally sufﬁcient size levels to
experience competitive pressures from scale differences. Therefore,
they limited their statistical analyses of scale competition to only the
“larger” ﬁrms in each of several populations, based on annual produc-
tion output to indicate scale. The use of a size threshold to classify
ﬁrms as scale competitors is admittedly imperfect, but it is justiﬁed
strongly by the history and cost structure of the automobile industry.
It is also supported by some limited data we have on American auto-
mobile producers, showing that the smallest ﬁrms were most likely
to engage in custom production, to operate out of a garage or shop
rather than a factory, to use nongasoline engines, and to offer special-
ist designs such as cycle cars, highwheelers, triwheel cars, kits cars,
replica cars, and the like. In our view, this is a conservative cutoff
point because it uses many small ﬁrms that are perhaps not subject to
strong scale pressure.
6Niche overlap can be measured in a variety of different ways, most
notably by weighing the fraction of a ﬁrm’s niche that overlaps with
others as opposed to just counting the number of overlaps (Baum and
Singh 1994a). However, constructing the fractional measure requires
precise knowledge of the distribution of production within each ﬁrm’s
niche, which is unavailable to us.
7Although we do not know the exact number of models produced
within the niche of each ﬁrm, historical evidence, industry accounts,
and empirical data (where available) convinced us that the assumption
of a symmetric distribution of technological capabilities for automo-
bile production across the ﬁrm’s scope is justiﬁed. With this assump-
tion, the midpoint of the niche is a valid representation of a ﬁrm’s
position in technological space.
8We also tested an alternative explanation to Hypotheses 2 and 3:
Large generalists’ propensity to repeat prior changes declines as a
function of some unobserved state effect. That is, the arrival at a mar-
ket state (rather than subsequently developing organizational design
features) that allows ﬁrms to experience sustained growth and expan-
sion is what triggers the decline in the intent to change. We tested this
alternative explanation by considering whether scale-driven positional
advantages enjoyed by an organization in its current state explains
away the hypothesized effects of niche width and size. We used rela-
tive size as a proxy for state-related advantage and interacted it with
cumulative prior change. The effect was insigniﬁcant and did not
improve ﬁt, so we concluded that our support for Hypotheses 2 and 3
is not an artifact of prior successful organizational performance.
9An implicit fallacy in estimating effects of change on mortality has to
do with the likelihood that organizations in trouble, that are already at
risk of failure, might also be more prone to resort to change (Carroll
and Hannan 2000). In this way, the deleterious effect of change on
survival might be due not to processes related to internal transforma-
tion (as we theorize here), but to the already elevated failure chances
of ﬁrms that embark on it. To eliminate the potentially spurious effect
of change on survival, we re-estimated the failure-rate Model 3b using
a two-stage speciﬁcation (Heckman 1979, Lee 1983) in which the
estimates from the rate-of-change Model 2b were included as a con-
trol. The results, estimated using the method of generalized estimating
equations (the XTGEE module in version 6.0 of STATA) and pre-
sented in Appendix C, are remarkably similar to the ones obtained
using the event history speciﬁcation.
10In the face of conﬂicting ﬁndings from the analysis of niche-width
expansion in the Italian auto industry (Kim et al. 2003), we are not
sure how to interpret these coefﬁcients without resorting to ad hoc
explanations. More research is needed to untangle the implications of
scale and scope for change in market position.
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